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Abstract 
 
The UK Women’s Equality Party (WEP) was established in 2015 in order to ‘bring 
about change by winning – support, votes and seats’.  It has thus far recruited tens 
of thousands of members and run candidates in national, devolved and local 
elections. This article provides one of the first empirical analyses of this new actor in 
UK politics. Adopting a feminist institutionalist lens we examine the extent to which 
WEP ‘does things differently’ by looking at discourse, formal party rules and informal 
ways of doing things ‘on the ground’. Drawing upon a set of semi-structured 
interviews, observations of local and national party meetings, and document 
analysis, we argue that while WEP has to some extent tried to set up alternative 
participatory structures and new ‘ways of working’, it has also at times fallen back on 
more traditional, centralised and hierarchical modes of party organising, as well as 
informalized practices, which are more typically associated with male-dominated 
parties. 
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The ‘story’ of women’s representation in the United Kingdom has been one of 
promise unfulfilled. On the one hand, all of the major UK parties have made at least 
rhetorical attempts to engage with both the descriptive (or numerical) representation 
of women and the substantive representation of women’s issues and interests 
(Childs 2008; Kenny 2018). There are also prominent women ‘at the top’ of British 
politics – at time of writing including not only Prime Minister Theresa May, but also 
First Minister of Scotland and leader of the Scottish National Party Nicola Sturgeon; 
and the leader of Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party Arlene Foster, 
amongst others.  
 Yet whilst there has been some progress with respect to the feminization of 
UK politics, this has stalled in recent years. Despite the presence of women in 
leadership positions across UK legislatures, as well as a vibrant, visible and active 
women’s movement (Evans, 2015), women remain under-represented at all levels of 
UK politics. Recent political developments highlight the ways in which UK politics 
continues to be coded as male in multiple and overlapping ways: women were 
disproportionately selected in unwinnable seats in the 2017 general election1; a 
recent report commissioned by MPs found that as many as one in five people 
working in Westminster has experienced sexual harassment2; black and Asian 
women MPs are disproportionately the target of online abuse3; and women 
politicians are not only less likely to receive media coverage, but are also less likely 
to be taken seriously (Ross et al, 2013). In short, there is some way to go toward 
achieving equality of power between men and women in British politics.  
 
 In explaining the persistence of women’s political under-representation, 
scholars have repeatedly pointed to the important gatekeeping role of political 
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parties, citing evidence of well-entrenched gender bias in British party politics, 
including direct and indirect forms of gender-based discrimination against women 
(Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Lovenduski, 2005; Childs, 2008). Work in the field has 
increasingly focused on political parties as gendered organizations, highlighting the 
ways in which both the formal and informal ‘rules of the game’ often create an 
inhospitable climate for women members and candidates (Lovenduski, 2005; Childs 
and Webb, 2012; Kenny, 2013). As Lovenduski (2005: 56) famously notes: ‘If 
parliament is the warehouse of traditional masculinity…political parties are its major 
distributors.’  
It is within this political context that the UK Women’s Equality Party emerged 
in March 2015, driven by a desire to see ‘women enjoy the same rights and 
opportunities as men so that all can flourish.’4 Later that year the party officially 
registered with the Electoral Commission, and Reuters journalist Sophie Walker had 
been appointed party leader5. By the end of the year, the party claimed to have 
around 65,000 members and over 70 local branches across the UK, whilst also 
fielding candidates in local, devolved and general elections. Women’s parties are not 
new – there have been more than thirty formed in Europe in the last three decades – 
but they provide important insights into the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion 
within political parties, and can serve as channels of representation and mobilization 
for women (Cowell-Meyers, 2016). Moreover, as female-dominated parties 
specifically committed to challenging the unequal distribution of political power, they 
offer the possibility of ‘doing things differently’ in party politics, potentially opening up 
‘new pathways to political inclusion’ (AUTHOR REF). 
 This paper explores these questions through a qualitative case study of the 
UK Women’s Equality Party (WEP), providing an in-depth analysis of the process of 
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‘building’ a women’s party on the ground. Using a feminist institutionalist lens, the 
article assesses the party as a ‘new’ organization, mapping formal rules and 
processes, as well as informal norms and practices in the first two years of the 
party’s existence. It evaluates the extent to which WEP has managed to ‘do politics 
differently’, in terms of its ideology, organizational structure, and ways of working. 
We find that while WEP has attempted to formalize ‘new’ innovations in terms of 
alternative participatory structures and feminist modes of organizing, these exist 
alongside ‘older’ and more hierarchical modes of party decision-making and 
leadership. Moreover, despite a rapidly developing formal rule book, the party has 
tended to fall back on informalized practices, which are more typically associated 
with male-dominated parties. In the case of WEP then, possibilities for ‘doing politics 
differently’ have been constrained by institutional legacies, as well as ongoing 
dynamics in the British political system (including gender regimes), which have 
largely foreclosed opportunities for new political paths. This case study therefore 
improves our understanding of both the general and gendered obstacles to 
institutional innovation and party change. 
 
GENDER, PARTIES AND INSTITUTIONS 
Feminist scholars of party politics have begun to shift their focus from ‘women in’ to 
‘gender and’ political parties (see, for example, Lovenduski, 2005; Hinojosa, 2012; 
Bjarnegård, 2013; Kenny, 2013). In doing so, many of these scholars have drawn 
upon the insights of ‘feminist institutionalism’, a variant of new institutional theory 
which seeks ‘to include women as actors in political processes, to ‘gender’ 
institutionalism, and to move the research agenda towards questions about the 
interplay between gender and the operation and effect of political institutions’ 
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(Mackay et al., 2010: 574). We understand gender here as a constitutive element of 
social relations based upon perceived differences between women and men, and as 
a way of signifying and naturalizing relationships of power and hierarchy (cf. Scott, 
1986). Feminist institutionalism (FI) is centrally concerned with the analysis of power: 
institutions, in this view, are not gender-neutral, but rather they reflect and reinforce 
power inequalities (Kenny, 2007). FI scholars conceptualize institutions as the ‘rules 
of the game’, which provide a structure of incentives and disencentives to political 
actors, but also express norms of appropriate and inappropriate behaviour 
(Lowndes, 2014). They have also sought to evaluate how discourse shapes and is 
shaped by institutions, highlighting the complex and gendered interplay between 
‘interrelations of institutional arrangements, actor constellations and political 
discourse’  (Kulawik, 2009: 267; see also Kantola, 2006). 
 Political parties, as gendered organisations, play an important role in shaping 
the extent to which women (and indeed which women) are included or excluded from 
the political process (Lovenduski, 2005). Much of the work on gender and party 
politics has focused on formal regulations and party rules, demonstrating, for 
example, how ‘new’ formal rule changes like electoral system reform and the 
adoption of gender quotas can alter established party practices, leading to increases 
in women’s political presence (see for example Dahlerup, 2006). Yet, research in the 
field also points to the importance of comparing the content of formal rules to actual 
practices (Bjarnegård and Kenny, 2016; Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2016). Formal 
rule changes tend to have a larger impact on parties who are also ‘rule-followers’ 
(Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2016), but may have very little effect on parties that are 
more informalized; thus, we can never assess formal rules on their own.  More 
recent scholarship, then, has sought to investigate more explicitly both the specific 
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influence of informal institutions within political parties, as well as the interplay 
between formal and informal rules.  
Rather than look at formal and informal rules as separate and contrasting 
elements of the institutional landscape then, an FI approach highlights the need to 
consider a continuum from highly formal to informal, with many places in between 
(Kenny, 2013; Bjarnegård and Kenny, 2015). On the one hand, informal practices 
may reinforce change, ensuring that formal rules are actually complied with. Informal 
networks and relationships can also be mobilized in favour of women, in order to 
push for party and policy change (see for example Piscopo, 2016). Yet, on the other 
hand, informal practices can often conflict with or override formal rule changes or 
exist alongside formal arrangements as a parallel institutional framework (Helmke 
and Levitsky, 2006). And when formal rules are not actively maintained or enforced, 
political actors can also mobilize informal practices to resist formal rule changes 
(such as gender quotas) that clash with their interests (Hinojosa 2012; Bjarnegård 
and Kenny, 2015). 
The UK Women’s Equality Party provides an interesting case through which 
to interrogate the gendered dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in party politics and 
evaluate the design of a new party from the ground up. As Kimberly Cowell-Meyers 
(2016: 4) highlights, women’s parties are defined by their ‘explicit agenda to advance 
the volume and range of women’s voices in politics’. Emerging in contexts where 
women were unevenly empowered, these ‘new’ parties attempt to distinguish 
themselves from ‘distrusted’ mainstream parties in a number of ways: including, 
often emphasizing a non-partisan ideology; adopting non-hierarchical and 
decentralized power structures; and implementing feminist modes of organizing and 
consciousness-raising tactics (Zaborsky, 1987; Dominelli and Jonsdottir, 1998; 
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Cowell-Meyers, 2011, 2016; AUTHOR REF). Yet, both party politics and gender 
scholars have raised “the question of what constitutes ‘newness’ and what qualifies 
as ‘new’” (Barnea and Rahat, 2010: 304). Political organizations and institutions are 
rarely created de novo; rather they are ‘nested’ within dense institutional 
environments, including gender regimes (cf. Mackay, 2014). ‘New’ party 
organizations are likely to be shaped by both the past as well ongoing interactions 
with the existing and political party system; similarly ‘old’ parties are never static, 
incorporating new elements, and reforming structures and rules (Barnea and Rahat, 
2010). Institutional and organizational innovation, then, is often a case of bounded 
change within an existing system, which can both open up, but also foreclose 
opportunities for new paths and ways of working.  
By investigating the extent to which WEP has built a ‘different’ kind of party, 
we contribute to the burgeoning literature on women’s parties as a means through 
which to increase the access and inclusion of marginalized groups (Cowell-Meyers, 
2016, 2017, this issue; AUTHOR REF). Moreover, while this growing body of work 
has often focused on the ‘demand side’ of the story around why women’s parties 
emerge, we add an important dimension to this research by focusing on women’s 
parties as organizational actors, focusing on the ‘inner life’ of political parties and the 
design and implementation of formal and informal rules ‘on the ground’. By 
highlighting the importance of attending to the ways in which ‘new’ parties are 
enacted in gendered ways by gendered actors using formal and informal rules and 
practices, this article therefore contributes to the ‘big questions’ with regards to party 
organizations and the party and political system, highlighting both general and 
gendered challenges to effecting change.  
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METHODS 
Studying the emergence of the Women’s Equality Party in the United Kingdom 
provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the ‘building’ of a new political party and 
the design of and interplay between formal and informal rules in action. Formal rules 
are consciously designed and specified in writing (Lowndes, 2014). Researching 
formal party rules is relatively straightforward, then, involving the collection of party 
documents and written material; although, as Bjarnegård and Kenny (2015) point 
out, these are not always readily available to outsiders. In the case of WEP, a range 
of documents were collected and analysed from the first two years of the party’s 
existence, dating from the formation of the party in March 2015, until just after the 
party’s first conference in November 2016. These documents were used in two 
ways: first, as a source of thick description, setting the context and providing a ‘paper 
trail’ of the sequence of events in WEP’s early formation, as well as the party’s 
organizational architecture; and second, as temporally and historically situated 
accounts that are receptacles of particular norms, meanings and values. These 
included official party documents such as WEP’s policy manifestos for UK and 
Scottish elections; the party’s constitution; and party guidelines for parliamentary and 
other selections. Other documents – including candidate and party campaign 
materials, minutes of meetings, internal party correspondence, and relevant media 
coverage – were either obtained by the authors, or provided by party officials, 
candidates and members. 
Informal dynamics within political parties are more difficult to capture, partly 
because of the often ‘hidden’ character of these practices (Hinojosa 2012; 
Bjarnegård and Kenny, 2015). Accordingly, scholars working in the FI tradition have 
tended to use more time-consuming and field-intensive qualitative methods to 
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identify the ‘rules-in-use’ in particular empirical contexts, including in-depth 
interviews; participant and non-participant observation; and semi-ethnographic 
methods (see for example Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Malley, 2012; Verge and de 
la Fuente 2014). These kinds of approaches are important to understand the role 
that informal practices and conventions play in particular party contexts, but also to 
investigate whether formal rules and regulations really do structure behavior in 
practice (Lowndes, 2014).  
 These issues were particularly important in the case of WEP, where during 
the empirical time frame in question, relatively few rules were written down (or were 
in the process of being written down at the time). Interviews were therefore often the 
most effective method for understanding the how, what, when, where and why of 
political decision-making (cf. Lowndes, 2014). We conducted twenty semi-structured 
interviews (each lasting between one and two hours), undertaken between March 
2015 and May 2018. The interview sample included central party officers and staff, 
election candidates, and branch officers and members. We focused primarily on 
branches in London and Scotland – as key sites in the run-up to the London mayoral 
and Scottish Parliament elections, where the party ran candidates for the first time in 
2016. To unearth the ‘real’ rules guiding party decision-making, we talked to actors 
themselves about ‘how things are done around here’ and ‘why do you do X but not 
Y?’ (cf. Lowndes, 2014; see Appendix 1). Alongside formal interviews and document 
analysis, we also deployed ‘rapid ethnographic’ techniques (Galea et al, 2015), 
observing party meetings and candidate campaign events at branch and national 
level, as well as the party’s inaugural conference in Manchester in 2016 (with 
observations and interactions recorded in field notes). As Schwartz-Shea and Majic 
(2017) highlight, ‘getting close’ to the subjects under study can provide key evidence 
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that is not necessarily accessible by other means, and, in this case, yielded more 
rich and detailed material about WEP’s internal party dynamics, the ‘rules-in-use’ 
within the party and their implementation in practice (see also Majic ,2017).  
 Our research design raised a number of challenges that are worth noting. 
Semi-ethnographic methods require considerable effort to be expended in 
developing relationships and building trust in order to gain access (Schwartz-Shea 
and Majic, 2017). This presented challenges for us in terms of our position vis-à-vis 
the party, where, as feminist scholars, it was sometimes assumed by research 
participants that we were party members (we are not), or that we could offer advice 
on party strategy or policy. We addressed these concerns by explaining the research 
process and likely sites of publication, as well as formally presenting our initial 
research findings to groups within the party, situating these within the wider body of 
research on women’s parties. It was also agreed with all interviewees that they 
would not be identified personally. Given the small number of candidates and branch 
officers, this has also meant that we anonymized some interviewee roles and 
locations. An additional challenge of studying WEP as a new party in the early 
stages of its development was that internal consistency and levels of knowledge 
varied widely regarding party rules, organizational structures, and policy positions. 
This meant that as researchers it was essential to follow events ‘on the ground’ as 
closely as possible; but also highlighted that divergent accounts from different 
participants are themselves a part of the research ‘process’, shedding light into the 
ways in which particular events and meanings are constructed at different times and 
in different institutional sites6.  Finally, our single case study design presents certain 
trade-offs in terms of our ability to make wider theoretical and empirical claims. 
However, it is important not to interpret these issues through the prism of statistical 
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methods; case studies make different claims to generalizability. Indeed, the goal for 
feminist institutionalist scholars is to identify common causal mechanisms (of power, 
continuity, change) – mechanisms which are often most visible at the level of single 
case studies and which may have portability in other contexts (cf. Pierson, 2004; 
Mackay et al, 2010).  
 
WEP: DISCURSIVELY DIFFERENT? 
Political parties are not singular organizations – they are, as Katz and Mair (2009) 
note, akin to ‘political systems’, nested within wider institutional configurations and 
composed of different ‘faces’ or aspects.  One significant litmus test for ‘newness’ is 
the party’s label and ideology; both are important ways that parties can distinguish 
themselves from the political ‘status quo’ as they present themselves to the 
electorate (Barnea and Rahat 2010). In terms of its label, WEP initially attracted 
some criticism from within the feminist community for calling themselves a ‘women’s 
party’ rather than a ‘feminist party’7. While the majority of our interviewees identified 
as feminists, and felt that WEP was a feminist party, other members openly objected 
to this in party meetings and events and preferred the ‘women’s party’ label: ‘I guess 
initially there was a bit of effort not to use the word because it’s just so laden with lots 
of stuff.’ However, party leader Sophie Walker and party co-founder Catherine Mayer 
repeatedly self-identified as feminist during speeches and public interviews, and the 
party has subsequently described itself as the ‘UK’s first feminist political party’ on its 
website8.  
 Despite contestations over the party’s label, the clearest difference between 
WEP and other UK parties is its ideology. WEP’s claim that they were ‘borne out of a 
demand for a different kind of politics’9 was echoed by party interviewees, who 
 12 
regularly invoked the rhetoric of difference: ‘people are tired of the way in which 
parties carry on, they want something new and something different and we are really 
speaking to that’. Women’s parties are not women’s wings or branches of 
established political parties, they are ‘self-conscious and explicit constructions 
around gender’ that seek to disrupt male-dominated institutions and structures of 
political power (Cowell Meyers, 2016: 5; see also Dominelli and Jonsdottir 1988). As 
with other women’s parties, then, female dominance is not seen as problem for the 
Women’s Equality Party, but rather as a given (see also Bjarnegård and Freidenvall, 
this issue). Formally, WEP allows both men and women to join the party to stand as 
candidates and does not use gender quotas. However, in practice, the overwhelming 
majority of its candidates have been women. In 2016, for example, the party ran 
twenty-six candidates in the devolved and London elections, only one of which was a 
man (occupying the fourth of six positions on the party’s regional list in Glasgow).  
The party has also tried to adopt an intersectional feminist praxis, seeing this 
as a key point of differentiation from traditional male-dominated parties: ‘I don’t want 
to be like those male political parties who are speaking for women’. Initially, however, 
there were few formal rules around intersectionality, an issue which we return to in 
the next section. According to London interviewees, the central party was keen to 
ensure that a diverse range of candidates were selected for the London Assembly 
elections in May 2016, with Central HQ instructing the London branches to nominate 
three people for the list, at least one of whom should be a black or ethnic minority 
candidate. However, in the time period under study, the party did not have any 
formal rules on the books with regards to intersectional representation. Moreover, 
while the party’s first leader Sophie Walker repeatedly reaffirmed the importance of 
intersectional feminist politics during her tenure – for example, using her first speech 
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to party conference in 2016 to highlight the party’s commitment to women of colour, 
disabled women and the LGBT community – she subsequently resigned from the 
party in January 2019, citing her frustration with the ‘limits’ of her own work to 
‘ensure that women of colour, working class women and disabled women see 
themselves reflected in [WEP] and know they can lead this movement.’10 
While all women parties use their party label to designate themselves as the 
representatives of women, some are more preoccupied with inclusion and 
representation than radical transformation (Cowell-Meyers 2016). In the case of 
WEP, the party initially assumed a non-partisan label - a political strategy commonly 
adopted by women’s parties in order to have an impact across the political spectrum 
(Cowell-Meyers, 2011; Bjarnegård, and Freidenvall in this volume). The party’s non-
partisan stance is formally entrenched in its core policy document, first published in 
2015, which describes WEP as a ‘focused mainstream party’ that ‘will never take a 
party line on issues outside our remit’ (Women’s Equality Party 2015). Formal 
guidance for candidates seeking selection also states that WEP candidates are ‘non-
partisan’ and ‘free to express’ their own personal views on issues beyond the party’s 
‘core goals and policies – driving women’s equality up the political agenda’ 
(Women’s Equality Party, 2016a). 
In practice, however, the party leans left. Research on women and politics 
overwhelmingly suggests that left parties are more likely to promote women’s 
descriptive and substantive representation because they espouse egalitarian 
ideologies that are centred on equality of outcome (Caul 1999; Lühiste and Kenny 
2016). Parties of the right, on the other hand, promote an ‘equality of opportunity’ 
approach that centres on a gender-neutral understanding of political power, or that 
emphasises a more traditional view of women’s roles. Yet while WEP’s left-of-centre 
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policy positions perhaps help to differentiate it further from traditional male-
dominated parties, the party has largely adopted a liberal feminist perspective 
centrally focused on equality, rather than wider structural change – although it did 
adopt more radical positions on the controversial issue of prostitution, with a 
commitment to the Nordic model (AUTHOR REF). In its first formal policy document, 
the party outlined six core objectives around issues of equal representation, pay, 
parenting and caregiving, education, treatment in the media, and an end to violence 
against women (Women’s Equality Party, 2015). The party does not have an 
economic policy or foreign policy. As such, in focusing on representation and 
equality rather than radical transformation, the party has failed to convincingly 
differentiate itself from established mainstream parties in the UK, which, as 
previously highlighted, have become increasingly ‘feminized’ in terms of formal and 
informal commitments to advancing women’s descriptive and substantive 
representation, and have shifted towards a more liberally feminist position (Childs, 
2008; Kenny, 2018). It also means that the party’s liberal gender frame is further 
disconnected from the dominant ideologies of the UK women’s movement (Evans 
2015, 2016).  
WEP has also strategically employed discursive tactics used by male-
dominated parties, in particular drawing on existing discourses around ‘anti-politics’ 
to differentiate themselves from mainstream ‘politics as usual’. Anti-politics refers to 
‘negative sentiment towards the activities and institutions of formal politics’ (Clarke et 
al, 2018: 17). Anti-politics should not simply be conflated with skepticism or apathy; 
rather it describes an active negativity targeted towards politicians and parties in 
general. It has been increasingly associated with support for populist parties, which 
have sought to capitalize on anti-political sentiment by arguing that they represent 
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‘the people’ against ‘elite’ politicians and parties. In the United Kingdom, these 
discursive strategies have been employed most obviously by the United Kingdom 
Independence Party, a far-right Eurosceptic political party which has sought to 
channel the frustrations of the so-called ‘left behind’ (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; 
Jennings et al, 2016).  
WEP has repeatedly used the ‘out of touch’ trope to describe mainstream 
parties, a discursive tactic common amongst populist parties who frame themselves 
as ‘anti-political politicians’ (Clarke et al, 2018). For instance, the membership 
section of WEP’s website declares that the ‘politics that dominate the UK are 
unrepresentative, uninspiring and out of touch with everyday women's needs,’11 
whilst leader Sophie Walker observed that ‘politics has become a word that means 
distant people.’ 12 Some interviewees further confirmed that they were directly 
‘inspired’ by UKIP’s strategy of appealing to the electorate: ‘if you like at UKIP and 
their message, I mean I obviously don’t agree with them, but their message has 
worked really well and I think we can use that.’ Meanwhile, another interviewee 
observed that ‘UKIP gets its message across and makes it clear that the mainstream 
parties are out of touch. We need to do that too, although you know, without the 
racism.’ Yet, despite adopting similar tactics to UKIP, the party’s has still managed to 
differentiate itself by adding a gendered dimension to anti-politics arguments. In 
other words, the party argues that it is not just politicians and parties that are out of 
touch, but that the political class is dominated by male politicians who are out of 
touch with women’s interests, and who are therefore unable to advance women’s 
equality: ‘when I’m speaking to people, they get that something’s gone wrong with 
our politics and that politics don’t seem to understand what people want anymore, 
and part of that is that it’s men who are the ones dominating politics.’ 
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WEP: ORGANIZATIONALLY DIFFERENT? 
As new parties, women’s parties are marked by a high degree of fluidity, both in 
terms of their support base as well as their organizational infrastructure. ‘Newness’ 
can open up spaces for innovation and ‘doing things differently’, free from the 
general and gendered biases and vested interests that can be found in existing 
organizations and institutions. Yet these ‘moments’ of opportunity are then followed 
by longer periods of institutionalization and uncertainty, as new structures, rules and 
practices are either embedded and consolidated, or amended, neglected and 
discarded (cf. Mackay, 2014). Moreover, as already highlighted, while women’s 
parties are ‘new’ entrants to the political system, they are not free-floating; they 
emerge from within and interact with wider institutional and party political 
environments, constraining the potential for institutional innovation and limiting 
possibilities for reform. New parties also face particular challenges in that they are 
not just electoral vehicles, they are organizational actors who have to ‘reconcile 
conflicting external and internal demands’ (of which vote-winning is only one) in 
order to survive in the long run (Bolleyer, 2013: 3). These issues are particularly 
acute for ‘rooted’ new parties emerging alongside social movements – such as 
women’s parties or green parties – which must manage the relationship between 
party and movement actors and structures (Dominelli and Jonsdottir, 1988; Bolleyer, 
2013). 
Panebianco (1988: 54) famously argues that ‘all parties must institutionalize to 
a certain extent to survive.’ In other words, new parties need to build a viable 
organizational infrastructure where the ‘rules of the game’ (both formal and informal) 
are routinized and regularized within the party (cf. Levitsky, 1998). Studies of 
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women’s political representation add an important gendered dimension to these 
dynamics, generally arguing that formally institutionalized and bureaucratized rules 
and processes are more ‘women-friendly’ – that is, rules that are ‘detailed, explicit, 
standardized, implemented by party officials, and authorized in party documents’ 
(Norris, 1996: 202; see also Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2016). Procedures that are 
rule-bound and formalized are easier for political ‘outsiders’ and traditionally under-
represented groups to identify and understand, and provide more grounds to appeal 
if political actors feel unjustly treated. Informalized or patronage-based party 
organizations, in contrast, are characterized by the lack of formal party rules, or rules 
that are written down but not implemented. These kinds of party organizations are 
generally less open to women and other marginalized groups, as power tends to be 
passed on through networks to ‘insiders’, who are usually men from majority groups 
(Bjarnegård, 2013).  
Has WEP done things differently in terms of how it organizes? Our research 
of the party presents a mixed picture. In the early days of the party’s formation, few 
rules were ‘on the books’, and those that were formally codified were not necessarily 
followed, or were inconsistently applied. For example, candidate selection operated 
differently in different sites: some candidate lists were voted on by party members, 
while other candidates were selected by the central party, with varying degrees of 
vetting. WEP therefore resembles a more traditional male-dominated party, in that it 
is highly informalized (AUTHOR REF; see also Bjarnegård and Freidenvall, this 
issue). However, informality in male-dominated parties is often institutionalized and 
routinized – for example in clientelist parties where behavior does not necessarily 
correspond to formal rules, but nevertheless follows regularized patterns of behavior 
that are ‘well established and widely shared’ amongst insiders (Levitsky, 1998; 
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Bjarnegård, 2013). WEP, in contrast, has been a party in flux, with few stable rules of 
the game, either formal or informal.  
Similar findings have been reported in other studies of women’s parties, which 
further highlight that these parties are often reluctant to formalize party rules, not 
only because they are ‘new’, but also because they do not want to reinforce and 
entrench political hierarchies (Bjarnegård and Freidenvall, this issue). Women’s 
parties therefore tend to adopt a feminist approach to organizing, one characterized 
by non-hierarchical, decentralized and consensus-based decision-making (Zaborsky, 
1987; Levin, 1999). Additionally, as organizationally new actors, they have had less 
time to build up followers and supporters who might stay loyal, and need to also think 
about ways to sustain and grow their initial support, while also building a sense of 
belonging amongst their followers (Bolleyer, 2013). 
WEP has implemented a number of innovations on this front, though some 
have been more successful than others. At entry level, for example, the party has 
introduced an ‘affiliate membership’ category, open to members of other political 
parties sharing WEP’s aims. Several activists and members saw this as a distinctive 
offer, citing the party’s official non-partisan stance and emphasis on collaborative 
ways of working: ‘it gets us beyond partisan approaches which is really important.’ 
The party’s commitment to collaborative and cross-party politics is also formally 
institutionalized in its mission statement’13, while subsequent iterations of its policy 
document have explicitly encouraged other political parties to work with WEP to 
deliver its policies, or ‘simply to steal them’ (Women’s Equality Party, 2017). Yet the 
party’s political inexperience has caused tensions with some of the main UK political 
parties, particularly on the left, most of which formally bar members from joining or 
supporting other parties (AUTHOR REF). Indeed, in some reported instances, 
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individuals have been expelled from their original parties for registering as WEP 
affiliate members. 14    
WEP also have claimed to adopt an innovative approach with regards to 
policy development, with members invited to actively participate in the party’s policy-
making process. This was formally highlighted in the party’s first policy statement, 
described as being ‘shaped by our members and supporters…working 
collaboratively with experts and policy-makers.’ While consultation was initially 
facilitated via local branches (described by one party member as a ‘crowdsourcing’ 
approach), members are also able to vote on or propose policy changes at party 
conference.  The party’s constitution – adopted at WEP’s first conference in 2016 – 
states that party conference is sovereign with regards to policy positions, excepting 
those decisions taken by the Steering Committee in between conferences. Involving 
members in party decision-making is not new in UK politics –the centrist Liberal 
Democrats, for example, have involved members in the policy-making process for 
many years (Evans, 2011). But, including members in this way can help party 
leaders signal their commitment to openness and intra-party democracy, and 
enhance their legitimacy. In practice, however, interviews and observations of WEP 
meetings and events demonstrated that this ‘bottom up’ approach was not 
straightforward. For example, interviewees highlighted that the party invites experts 
to write sections of policy documents, without grassroots involvement, while 
significant policy decisions (for example, around taking an initial position on Brexit) 
were decided by the party leadership without recourse to member consultation.  
Meanwhile, some members and branch officials highlighted the difficulties of 
participating in party conference, citing the lack of political experience amongst 
members, as well as a sense of confusion regarding both the substance and 
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implications of what members were being asked to vote on: ‘it was not always clear 
what we were voting for or how that might play out in different branches across the 
UK.’ This perspective echoed our own observations of party conference, during 
which some delegates appeared unprepared by what they were being asked to 
consider. Recognizing that for many of their members the process was new and 
potentially confusing, conference chairs repeatedly assured members that they 
would ‘learn by doing.’  
Thus, while WEP has criticized mainstream parties for being elite and out of 
touch, the party itself has continued to operate via a highly centralized and 
hierarchical organizational structure, often making strategic and policy decisions 
without the mandate of the membership. While the party’s initial structure was highly 
informalized – with no equivalent of a national executive committee and most 
decisions taken by staff and leadership at central HQ – subsequent formal rule 
changes have served to further concentrate power in the hands of the leadership. 
WEP’s first party conference in 2016 codified the role of two central and powerful 
committees: the Steering Committee (SC), as the party’s main-decision-making body 
between party conferences; and the Executive Committee (EC), responsible for 
operational decisions. The SC is composed of a combination of the party’s leader; 
lifetime members (the party’s co-founders) and appointees,; elected representatives; 
and randomly selected members. It has significant powers enumerated in the party’s 
constitution, including sole discretion over when and where to field election 
candidates; determining when and where to hold party conference, as well as the 
content of the conference agenda; and determining the timetable and process for 
party leadership elections (Women’s Equality Party, 2016b). There is considerable 
overlap in membership between the SC and the EC, which also includes the party 
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leader; the party’s two co-founders; as well as three members elected by the SC. In 
interviews, some activists – especially those who were new to political organizing 
and party politics – did not feel that this degree of centralization was problematic. 
Others were more critical of the party’s power structures, comparing it to other more 
hierarchical mainstream parties: ‘I was a member of the Labour Party before I joined 
WEP and I feel like members there had a greater say, which isn’t saying much.’ 
The party has introduced additional formal rule changes in response to these 
issues and criticisms. For example, the party has established a Policy Committee 
which is directly elected by simple majority vote at party conference, encompassing 
policy spokespeople and ‘movement-builders’ to shape the party’s key policy areas.  
Some members, however, felt that policy was still being driven by staff at the center, 
with one member of the committee stating that she was given no freedom to help 
shape the policy area which she had been elected to lead. Others claimed that policy 
was still being driven by staff at central HQ, with the Policy Committee expected to 
promote these policies rather than lead on their development. The party has also 
introduced term limits for the party leader, although the party’s first leadership 
election did not take place until 2018, with Sophie Walker acting as appointed leader 
for the first three years of the party’s existence. Although the election was not a close 
run race – Walker won with over 90% of the vote – the contest itself highlighted 
divisions within the party over power and decision-making structures, with her 
opponent Magda Devas proposing a ten-point plan to enhance transparency and 
accountability within WEP’s organizational structures. 
The party has also responded to decentralizing pressures by creating regional 
‘hubs’, which ‘oversee and coordinate the functioning of local branches in their 
area.’15 Yet there is no formal regional representation on the SC or the EC, and the 
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hubs framework falls well short of a fully federal party structure, which was proposed 
by members of the Scottish branches in 2016, and subsequently defeated by a vote 
of the party conference. Moreover, despite WEP’s espoused commitment to an 
intersectional feminist ideology (as discussed previously), this is not institutionalized 
in the party’s infrastructure. Indeed, requests for a black women’s caucus were 
initially denied by the party leadership (described as an ‘own goal’ by one activist), 
and, in contrast to several other UK parties, WEP does not set aside reserved seats 
on its leadership organs for under-represented or marginalized groups.  
Despite these tensions, however, there is some evidence of feminist 
approaches to organizing – particularly at branch level, although this remains 
informalized. As one interviewee expressed: ‘we keep having to go to HQ who just 
make decisions without consultation and we’ve just decided we’re going to get on 
with things here locally.’ While branch organizational structure has become more 
formalized after the adoption of the party’s constitution, our initial observations of 
party meetings in the early days of the party’s existence often saw members 
discussing issues in a horizontal and collective manner in the absence of official 
‘leaders.’ As one activist reflected: ‘Those first couple of meetings were so exciting, it 
really felt like we had found our people, we were talking about all the ways in which 
we could make women’s lives better and how we could do something new and 
important.’ Similarly, another activist recalled the ‘energy and enthusiasm’ in those 
early months and how many members had told her that they ‘had never experienced 
anything like it’.  
Local branch meetings have proven to be important sites for feminist 
discussion, with many engaging in consciousness-raising techniques to explore a 
range of issues from structural violence to educational inequality – a practice 
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identified in other women’s parties (Zaborszky, 1987; Dominelli and Jonsdottir, 
1988). We witnessed members reflecting upon their own personal experiences, 
encouraging each other to share their stories, and situating their experiences within 
a wider feminist politics. Older members, especially those who had been active 
within second wave feminism, spoke about how this reminded them of their previous 
activism whilst an interview with a woman in her twenties revealed how 
‘transformational’ she had found some discussions. We observed similar dynamics 
at party conference in breakout discussions away from the main plenary voting 
sessions; for example, the start of the workshop on sexual harassment in 
Universities was spent talking through the principles of a consensus-based model of 
discussion, explicitly drawing on techniques used by the Icelandic women’s party.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The establishment of the Women’s Equality Party in the United Kingdom raises 
important questions about the dynamics of gender, power and change. As new 
parties that are explicitly committed to challenging gender power relations, women’s 
parties provide a lens through which to explore the bounded nature and often 
contradictory outcomes of institutional innovation and design within established party 
and political systems. In doing so, they improve our understanding of intra-party and 
inter-party power dynamics, whilst also contributing to our knowledge of the general 
and gendered mechanisms of institutional continuity and change.  
The small but growing body of research on women’s parties to date has often 
focused on questions about why these parties emerge and what electoral impact 
they might have. Our analysis, in contrast, takes a party-centered and feminist 
institutionalist approach, assessing the Women’s Equality Party as a ‘new’ 
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organization, and mapping the formal architecture and informal practices of the party 
on the ground. Our findings suggest that while some innovations have been 
implemented by the party, possibilities for change have been limited, foreclosing 
opportunities for the party to ‘do things differently.’  
In terms of the party-in-the-electorate, we suggest that WEP can certainly 
make a distinctive case for their ‘difference’ in terms of their label and ideology. Yet, 
the extent to which the party has been able to position itself as a ‘new’ voice for 
gender equality has been constrained by the party’s liberal feminist position and 
policy platform, as well as the wider electoral and party context in the UK. Moreover, 
the party has (at times, uncritically) adopted discursive tactics used by male-
dominated political parties in order to establish its distinctiveness, particularly parties 
of the radical right, though it has attempted to gender these wider discourses and 
debates.  
Our evaluation of the party-as-organisation similarly suggests that WEP has 
taken few risks with regards to their organizational structure. Rule changes and 
innovations have not always had their intended effect (for example, with regards to 
party membership criterion); nor have they necessarily been ‘new’ (for example, 
member involvement in policy development). And while the party remains largely 
informalized, those formal rules that are ‘on the books’ have largely been used to 
consolidate the power of the leadership within a hierarchical party structure.  
Our analysis therefore highlights the importance of attending to the ‘gaps’ 
between the ‘rules of the game’ within parties and their actual interpretation, 
enactment and enforcement on the ground. The Women’s Equality Party is not a 
blank slate, but is instead ‘nested’ within a dense institutional environment that 
includes established electoral systems, party systems, and complex ideas and 
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institutions of political representation. Rather than innovate from scratch, then, WEP 
has, for the most part, simply replicated discourses, organizational patterns and 
structures of existing mainstream and anti-establishment parties. Nevertheless, we 
do highlight possibilities for creative agency and change, highlighting, for example, 
the ways in which the ‘soft spots’ between party rules and their implementation have 
opened up spaces for more horizontal and feminist approaches to party organizing, 
particularly at the local level. 
Our conclusions are, of course, necessarily partial, particularly given WEP’s 
status as a new party in the early stages of its development. Questions remain about 
its long-term viability, however, particularly given the recent resignation of leader 
Sophie Walker, which will provide a critical test for the party’s future. More broadly, 
the case of the Women’s Equality Party points to both the opportunities and trade-
offs of working within institutional and party frameworks to advance women’s 
descriptive and substantive representation, or whether alternative channels of 
mobilization and participation might be more open to feminist concerns.   
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